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Normativity, Realism, and Emotional Experience 
 
Norms are standards against which actions, dispositions of mind and character, states 
of affairs and so forth can be measured. They also govern our behaviour, make claims 
on us, bind us and provide reasons for action and thought that motivate us.  J. L. Mackie 
argued that the intrinsic prescriptivity, or to-be-pursuedness, of moral norms would 
make them utterly unlike anything else that we know of.  Therefore, we should favour 
an error theory of morality.  Mackie thought that the to-be-pursuedness would have to 
be built into mind-independent moral reality. One alternative, however, is that the to-
be-pursuedness is built into our faculty of moral sensibility.  There is a large body of 
empirical evidence demonstrating that the emotions play a central role in making moral 
judgments.  I shall argue that this helps to explain how normative judgments are 
reliably and non-accidentally related to motivation. I shall also argue that emotional 
experience has the right structure and properties to provide us with a defeasible warrant 
for normative knowledge.  The role of the emotions in our moral psychology does not 
obviously support anti-realism. Rather, emotional experience can be intentional, 
evaluative, evaluable, and quasi-perceptual. This makes emotional experience a 
plausible candidate for constituting a non-queer faculty of moral sensibility. 
 
1. Mackie’s Argument from Queerness 
 
Mackie summarises his argument from queerness as follows: 
 
If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities of a very 
strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe. Correspondingly, 
if we were aware of them, it would have to be by some special faculty of moral 
perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing 
everything else. (1977) 
 
Mackie thinks that the queerness of objective values and the queerness of any putative 
faculty of moral intuition–the metaphysical and epistemological strands of the 
argument from queerness respectively–follow from the kinds of facts about norms 
mentioned above, especially their intrinsic prescriptivity. In Mackie’s words, objective 
value would have to be ‘such that knowledge of it provides the knower with both a 
direction and an overriding motive; something’s being good both tells the person who 
knows this to pursue it and makes him pursue it’ (1977). Such an account of objective 
value is dramatically exemplified by Plato’s Form of the Good.  According to Mackie, 
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it is implausible that there is anything in the world answering to this description.  
Therefore, our moral thought and talk is systematically false. 
 
Although Mackie concentrates on morality, it is the normativity of moral values that is 
problematic, and so, if Mackie’s argument works at all, then it would seem it should 
work against non-moral forms of normativity too.  For example, the argument from 
queerness can be applied to epistemic, logical and semantic norms.  Similar 
considerations occur in the ‘Kripkenstein’ debates over rule-following.  There is a 
mysterious to-be-followedness about logical and semantic rules, which is hard to 
explain in terms of natural properties.  If this is right, the argument from queerness is 
self-defeating as an argument, for it undermines the norms that give us reason to accept 
it.  In fact, it undermines any argument that depends on logical inference. Thus, 
although much of my discussion focuses on moral norms, it is important to keep an eye 
on the bigger picture. Normative realism, not only moral realism, is at stake. 
 
Returning to the details of Mackie’s argument, we can identify two premises in the 
metaphysical strand. First, Mackie assumes that motivational internalism is true. 
Knowledge of the good, he tells us, would provide an ‘overriding motive’ such that the 
knower pursues it.1 Second, he assumes that motivational internalism would have to be 
true in virtue of the intrinsically prescriptive nature of objective value. Although there 
are reasons to doubt motivational internalism, I will put these aside in the present 
article, and accept at least the weaker, relatively uncontroversial claim that there is a 
reliable and non-accidental connection between recognising a normative reason for 
action and being defeasibly motivated to act in accordance with it.   
 
I want to focus on the second premise instead. In order for objective values to explain 
motivation, Mackie takes it that objective value would need to have ‘to-be-pursuedness 
somehow built into it’ (1977). It is this property of to-be-pursuedness which, he argues, 
makes objective values queer. The property of to-be-pursuedness is likely to seem 
especially queer ontological naturalists, i.e., advocates of the view that science is the 
																																																								
1 Earlier, Mackie writes that ‘just knowing them or “seeing” them will not merely tell men what to do 
but will ensure that they do it, overruling any contrary inclinations’ (1977). This seems to be an 
implausibly strong version of internalism according to which the connection between grasping a norm 
and being motivated to act is non-defeasible.  
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final arbiter of ontology. For, it seems unlikely that to-be-pursuedness would feature 
alongside properties like spin, mass and charge in any hypothetically completed 
physics of the future. This apparent unlikelihood explains the force of the metaphysical 
strand of the argument from queerness. Moreover, the apparent queerness of the 
motivational force of norms is sufficient to cast doubt on moral realism and to motivate 
forms of anti-realism. 
 
In fact, the metaphysical and epistemological strands of the argument are 
interdependent. The idea that to-be-pursuedness must be built into objective values 
underpins the epistemological strand of the argument. Mackie elaborates as follows: 
 
When we ask the awkward question, how we can be aware of this authoritative 
prescriptivity, of the truth of these distinctively ethical premises or of the cogency 
of this distinctively ethical pattern of reasoning, none of our ordinary accounts of 
sense perception or the framing and confirming of explanatory hypotheses or 
inference or logical construction or conceptual analysis, or any construction of 
these, will provide a satisfactory answer. (1977) 
 
By ‘our ordinary accounts of sense perception’ it seems likely that Mackie means 
accounts in terms of the causal interaction between an organism and its environment. 
The various patterns of reasoning he mentions then operate upon the contents or 
products of sensory experience. The problem, then, is that the property of to-be-
pursuedness does not seem to be the sort of property we can causally interact with 
(which helps to explain the thought that to-be-pursuedness is unlikely to appear in a 
final scientific ontology). We might say, in a Sellarsian idiom, that to-be-pursuedness 
is within the space of reasons, not a property causally impinging on that space. Given 
that to-be-pursuedness is not a property with which we can causally interact, it is hard 
to understand how we could perceive it.2 
 
There is, however, a way to undercut this line of argument. According to Mackie, 
motivational internalism must be grounded in, and explained by, recognition of the 
property of to-be-pursuedness that is somehow built into mind-independent normative 
reality. An alternative is that the motivational force of normative facts depends on facts 
																																																								
2 The argument has the same structure as the standard epistemological argument against Platonism in 
the philosophy of mathematics (see, e.g., Benacerraf (1973)). Mackie’s ‘error theory’ finds its 
mathematical parallel in Field’s fictionalism (see, e.g. Field (1988)). 
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about the perception, sensibility or awareness of moral agents. It might be, for example, 
that the faculty of moral sensibility is such that moral agents, and only moral agents, 
are reliably and non-accidentally motivated by normative facts when they perceive 
them (or, if internalism is correct, necessarily, but defeasibly, motivated).3 In this case, 
there would be no need to appeal to a further. External, mind-independent property of 
to-be-pursuedness. So, at a rough first pass, the normative facts would be in the world, 
but the to-be-pursuedness would be in the head insofar as an agent is disposed to be 
motivated by recognising those facts.  
 
2. Justificatory and Causal Explanations 
 
This sort of sentimentalist approach might not appear to be a live alternative for the 
moral realist who Mackie is criticising.  A possible concern is that it seems to relocate 
an essential feature of normativity away from the objective world and into subjective 
experience. It might be objected that a moral realist is committed to the view that 
normative facts and, hence, to-be-pursuedness are mind-independent.  Furthermore, if 
to-be-pursuedness is mind-independent then the facts that explain an agent’s 
motivation must be mind-independent too. However, this line of criticism trades on an 
ambiguity concerning what it is to explain motivation. An explanation might focus 
either on what causes a moral agent to be motivated or what justifies that motivational 
state. Causes and justification can coincide, but they are logically distinct. Moral 
realists defend the claim that there are objective, mind-independent good-making or 
right-making properties, and that these properties are such that moral agents are 
normatively governed by them. However, the cause of a moral agent’s motivation need 
not be a mind-independent property of to-be-pursuedness. The facts that causally 
explain their motivation could be facts about their faculty of moral sensibility. 
 
Moral realism does demand, however, that mind-independent, normative facts can 
justify moral agents’ states of motivation. Thus, in the justificatory sense, moral realists 
must explain the fact that a moral agent is appropriately motivated in terms of mind-
																																																								
3 Döring (2007) has also argued that the emotions can explain the motivational force of moral judgments 
(see further section 8). Whereas Döring takes internalism to be an a priori constraint on practical 
judgment, I favour the view that non-trivial statements of internalism are false. Arguing the point here, 
however, would lead me too far astray. 
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independent good-makers and right-makers. In order to do this, however, there is no 
need to appeal to a further queer property in the world, such as a property of to-be-
pursuedness. Indeed, such an appeal would be independently implausible. It is not as 
if the difference in motivational state between Smith, who sees some state of affairs as 
making moral demands on him, and Jones, who fails to see that the very same state of 
affairs makes moral demands on her, is to be explained by the fact that only Smith 
causally interacts with the property of to-be-pursuedness, which shines over a state of 
affairs like the star of Bethlehem. It seems far more plausible to suppose that the 
difference in motivational state is explained by differences in their respective moral 
sensibilities. To repeat, however, it does not follow that the facts that justify Smith are 
mind-dependent facts of the sort to trouble a moral realist.  
 
To sum up this section of the discussion, in order to counter the force of Mackie’s 
argument from queerness it would be sufficient to show that moral awareness is reliably 
and non-accidentally related to motivation. We could then make sense of the idea that 
moral agents’ motivational states are justified by the mind-independent, normative 
facts, while what makes it the case that appropriately rational agents will be motivated 
are facts about their faculty of moral sensibility. On this view, there is no need to make 
an appeal to metaphysically queer properties stitched into the fabric of the world like 
Plato’s Form of the Good. 
 
3. Moral Judgment, Emotion, and Realism 
 
Moral realism is the view that some propositions with moral content are both truth-apt 
and true.  Moreover, these propositions are true in virtue of standing in the appropriate 
relationship to mind-independent reality, e.g., by describing or corresponding to it.4  It 
would be possible for these conditions to obtain and for all our moral judgments to be 
false.  Perhaps we are systematically deceived or moral reality is too complex for us to 
understand or describe.  However, most moral realists also take it that some of our 
moral thought and talk are in good order in the sense that some of our moral judgments 
are true.  A faculty of moral sensibility consistent with this sort of moral realism would 
																																																								
4 Of course, some mind-independent facts depend on minds in the sense that they are about minds. It 
may also be that some mind-independent normative facts depend on minds in the sense that they concern 
the relations between minds and mind-independent states of affairs. 
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have to produce moral judgments with at least the following four features.  The moral 
judgments would have to (i) be about moral reality, (ii) have normative content, (iii) 
have correctness conditions and (iv) owe their content in some measure to the moral 
reality that they are about.  In the absence of (iv), it would be mere coincidence if any 
of our moral judgments turned out to be true and, so, we could not have moral 
knowledge.  I shall argue that certain forms of emotional experience are suitable 
candidates for constituting a faculty of moral sensibility with these features.  In 
particular, emotional experience can be intentional, evaluative, evaluable and quasi-
perceptual. This should help to dispel the impression that our faculty of moral 
sensibility must be queer.   
 
How, then, do we make moral judgments?  This is an empirical question, albeit one 
that cannot be answered independently of philosophical questions about the content of 
morality. The scientific evidence clearly supports the view that the emotions play a 
central role. Our ability to reason morally and prudentially, according to social rules, 
norms and conventions, depends on the proper functioning of regions of the brain 
associated with the emotions, including the amygdala, anterior insula, anterior 
temporal lobes, and prefrontal cortex. The ventromedial regions of the prefrontal cortex 
(an evolutionarily modern part of the brain located behind the bridge of the nose) 
appears to be crucial for the ‘higher cognitive’ emotions that play an essential role in 
moral judgment.5  I shall return to the importance of the higher cognitive emotions in 
section 7.  As these empirical findings have been discussed fairly extensively, I shall 
not provide a further survey here.6   
 
The role of the emotions in moral judgment is often taken to support moral anti-realism. 
If moral sensibility depends on the emotions and the emotions are non-rational feelings, 
ill-suited to respond to normative facts, this would seem to support the view that moral 
judgments do not track moral facts and favour either non-cognitivism or an error theory 
of morality. Non-cognitivism would find support from the idea that moral judgments 
express mental states without cognitive content. Error theorists might argue that 
																																																								
5 For details of fMRI studies showing that the regions of the brain associated with the emotions are active 
during moral cognition see Moll et al. (2002), Moll et al. (2005), Joshua D. Greene et al. (2004) and 
Zahn et al. (2009).   
6 See, for example, Damasio (1994); (1999), J. Greene, Haidt, J. (2002); Joshua D Greene (2009) Nichols 
(2004), Prinz (2007), Sneddon (2011) and Haidt (2012). 
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although moral judgments purport to express truths, they are in fact a product of the 
emotions, which systematically mislead us into thinking that there are mind-
independent moral properties.7  For instance, Greene writes:  
 
We believe in moral realism because moral experience has a perceptual 
phenomenology, and moral experience has a perceptual phenomenology because 
natural selection has outfitted us with mechanisms for making intuitive, emotion-
based judgments, much as it has outfitted us with mechanisms for making 
intuitive, emotion-based judgments about who among us are the most suitable 
mates. Therefore, we can understand our inclination towards moral realism not as 
an insight into the nature of moral truth, but as a by-product of the efficient 
cognitive processes we use to make moral decisions. (2003) 
 
In fact, if emotions have the right properties to function as a faculty of moral sensibility, 
then the fact that moral judgments routinely involve regions of the brain associated 
with emotional experience may support moral realism by offering the prospect of a 
non-mysterious moral epistemology. This is what I shall argue. 
 
4. Emotion and Feelings 
 
An influential approach in twentieth-century psychology was to identify emotions with 
feelings or unintelligent sensations, which psychologists, and later neuroscientists, 
could measure in the laboratory. Thus, the standard scientific view of the emotions 
concentrated on short-term physiological responses, in particular, disturbances to the 
neurological-hormonal-muscular core: facial expression, musculoskeletal responses, 
effects on the endocrine system and consequent variation in hormone levels, and 
activation of the autonomic nervous system. 
 
Feeling theories of the emotions are especially associated with William James and Carl 
Lange. More recently, they have been defended by philosophers including Whiting 
(2011) and Kriegel (2011).8 James stated his feeling theory as follows: 
																																																								
7 For example, Joyce (2006). 
8 Prinz (2005, 2007) also defends a qualified Jamesian view.  My discussion assumes a standard reading 
of James based primarily on his paper “What is an emotion?”.  However, Matthew Ratcliffe (2005) 
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The bodily changes follow directly the PERCEPTION of the exciting fact, and … our 
feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion. (1884) 
 
This reverses the pre-theoretical order of explanation defended by Darwin and others.  
We do not have butterflies in our stomach because we are nervous.  We are nervous 
because we have butterflies in our stomach.   
 
According to James’ view, an emotion is the perception of a particular pattern of 
physiological arousal and, so, it can be type-identified by that pattern. While a feeling 
can be accompanied by a judgment or an ‘emotional idea’ (1884: 196), the two are 
distinct and it is the feeling that we properly refer to as an ‘emotion’. Thus, he writes: 
 
If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our consciousness 
of it all the feelings of its characteristic bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing 
left behind, no “mind-stuff” out of which the emotion can be constituted, and that 




What kind of an emotion of fear would be left, if the feelings neither of quickened 
heart-beats nor of shallow breathing, neither of trembling lips nor of weakened 
limbs, neither of goose-flesh nor of visceral stirrings, were present, it is quite 
impossible to think. (1884) 
 
On James’ view, then, a judgment without the appropriate somatic phenomenology is 
just a judgment, rather than an emotion. This has become known as the ‘subtraction 
argument’. We are left with a mental state ‘purely cognitive in form, pale, colourless, 
destitute of emotional warmth’ (1884). What is distinctive and constitutive of the 
emotions is the way they feel. 
 
James seems right that occurent emotions typically involve particular forms of somatic 
phenomenology.  Moreover, it is significant that these bodily feelings are positively or 
negatively valenced (Charland 2005). Some emotions feel good and others feel bad. 
The distinction between feeling good and bad might be cashed out in terms of hedonic 
qualities, i.e. pleasure and pain, or in terms of approach and avoidance, or markers of 
																																																								
argues that when this paper is understood in the context of James’ later work, an account emerges 
according to which the feelings that constitute emotions are part of the structure of intentionality.  
According to this reading, which I find persuasive, there are important similarities between James’ 
account of the emotions and the kind of account I defend below. 
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reward and punishment (Prinz 2010). Whichever way, the valenced nature of the 
emotions means that they involve action tendencies or, as James put it, an ‘impulse to 
vigorous action’ (1884).9 We are motivated to increase the good feelings and decrease 
the bad feelings. Again, there are competing explanations of how the bodily feelings 
are related to the action tendency. The action tendency might be explained as the direct 
effect of the bodily feeling or via the production of a desire (say, that the painful feeling 
of anger stops). In either case, feelings are reliably and non-accidentally related to 
motivation, which is consistent with the idea that they could play a role in a faculty of 
moral sensibility that is reliably and non-accidentally related to motivation. 
 
Beyond emphasising the connection between feeling and emotion, James wanted to 
show that a judgment without an accompanying awareness of physiological 
disturbance would not count as an emotion at all. Conceptually, however, bodily 
feelings seem to be detachable from emotional states. It is possible to imagine a 
different sort of creature, or perhaps a suitably modified or impaired human, who could 
be angry without the typical physiological manifestations or sensations. 10  James 
himself recognises this point: 
 
I do not say that it is a contradiction in the nature of things, or that pure spirits are 
necessarily condemned to cold intellectual lives; but I say that for us, emotion 
disassociated from all bodily feeling is inconceivable. (1884) 
 
Although it is true that human emotions normally involve bodily feelings, there are 
also quite ordinary cases in which emotions remain with us long after the violent 
neurological-hormonal-muscular sensations and concomitant desire to act die down. 
Emotions can come in short fiery bursts, but they can also be long-lived and mostly 
unconscious, such as the enduring love of a mother for her child. Of course, some 
characteristic activity of the nervous system remains, but the same is true of all mental 
states. A mother does not only love her child when she is conscious of the 
																																																								
9 The relationship between emotions and action tendencies is clearest in the case of emotions about 
objects that are present. By contrast, the relationship seems less direct in the cases of certain past- or 
future-directed emotions such as regret or hope. In these cases, it may be better to say that the emotions 
are associated with dispositions to be motivated in suitable circumstances. 
10 Perhaps the closest actual case is patients suffering from pure autonomic failure (PAF).  In such cases, 
patients lose feedback from their sympathetic and parasympathetic systems.  While emotional responses 
are impaired, they are not absent.  See Critchley et al. (2001).  For a survey of some other empirical 
challenges to James’ account see Hufendiek (2016). 
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accompanying feelings. For this reason, it is standard to draw a distinction between 
occurent emotional episodes and emotional dispositions. 
 
5. Emotional Experience and Intentionality 
 
In recent decades, advocates of ‘cognitivist’ theories of the emotions have emphasised 
features of emotional experience that the Jamesian view neglects or downplays (e.g., 
Neu (2000), Nussbaum (2001), and Solomon (2007)). These include features that make 
emotional experience a plausible candidate for a non-queer faculty of moral sensibility.  
In particular, some emotional experiences are intentional, subject to rational 
evaluation, evaluative and quasi-perceptual.  To illustrates these claims, consider an 
example described by Goldie: 
 
Imagine you are in a zoo, looking at a gorilla grimly loping from left to right in its 
cage. You are thinking of the gorilla as dangerous, but you do not feel fear, as it 
seems to be safely behind bars. Then you see that the door to the cage has been left 
wide open. Just for a moment, though, you fail to put the two thoughts – the gorilla 
is dangerous, the cage is open – together. Then, suddenly, you do put them together: 
now your way of thinking of the gorilla as dangerous is new; now it is dangerous 
in an emotionally relevant way for you. The earlier thought, naturally expressed as 
‘That gorilla is dangerous’, differs in content from the new thought, although this 
new thought, thought with emotional feeling, might also be naturally expressed in 
the same words. Now in feeling fear towards the gorilla you are emotionally 
engaged with the world, and, typically, you are poised for action in a new way – 
poised for action out of the emotion. (2000) 
 
In this description, the emotion of fear is not experienced as a blind, undirected 
sensation. Rather, it is experienced as intentional in the sense that the fear is directed 
towards, or about, the gorilla. When someone is afraid, they are not afraid of changes 
in their hormonal state, increased heart rate and the like, but some state of affairs in the 
world.  
 
In fact, the intentional nature of the emotions has been commonly remarked on.  The 
idea can be traced back to Aristotle’s Rhetoric.11 In the psychological literature, it has 
been emphasised by theorists in the appraisal and psychological constructionist 
traditions for over a century (Gendron and Barrett 2009).  Among analytic 
																																																								
11 See, for example, his discussion of anger (1379a–1379b).  The idea is also important in Hellenistic 
philosophy and, especially, Stoicism.  See Nussbaum (1994). 
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philosophers, Kenny (1963) is usually credited with having first paid attention to the 
intentional structure of the emotions. Kenny argued that emotions are defined by their 
formal objects and, therefore, necessarily intentional.12 This is a logical-cum-semantic 
constraint.  For instance, Kenny argued that an emotional attitude only counts as fear 
because it takes something dangerous or fearful as its formal object. Solomon also 
defends the claim that emotions are necessarily intentional: ‘no feeling and no 
physiological response even counts as emotional unless it has the property of 
intentionality’ (2007: 205). This may not be right about all emotions (see section 7).  
However, even if we reject the strong claim that emotions are necessarily intentional 
states, it seems hard to deny that emotions can be intentional states. 
 
6. Emotion, Phenomenology, and Transmutation 
 
Sometimes emotional experience is not only about the world, but also appears to have 
representational content.  Phenomenologically, emotional experience can disclose the 
world to us in a new way. In particular, emotional experience can present states of 
affairs as normatively salient and, therefore, reasons for action. This claim has been 
defended by Sartre among others.  In his Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions, he calls 
an emotion ‘a transformation of the world’ (1962) and ‘a sudden fall of consciousness 
into magic’ (1962). Expanding on the metaphor of magic he writes: 
 
We have seen how, during an emotion, the consciousness abases itself and 
abruptly transmutes the determinist world in which we live, into a magical world. 
But, conversely, sometimes it is this world that reveals itself to consciousness as 
magical just where we expect it to be deterministic. It must not, indeed, be 
supposed that magic is an ephemeral quality that we impose upon the world 
according to our humour. There is an existential structure of the world which is 
magical. (1962) 
 
Although the idea is not precise, Sartre’s idea of magic seems to refer to a sort of post-
Weberian re-enchantment of the world that makes some courses of action appear 
possible, but forecloses others. He focuses on cases in which we project our emotions 
on to the world in order to excuse ourselves from acting and to reduce cognitive 
dissonance.13  
																																																								
12 See further Teroni (2007). 
13 See, for example, Sartre’s discussion of the girl who breaks down in emotion because she cannot face 
the prospect of caring for her sick father (1962). 
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As these are mere projections of magic, Sartre seems for the most part to endorse 
something like an error theory of the intentional content of emotions. So, it is unclear 
that he is entitled to say, as above, that the world reveals itself as magical or that it has 
a magical existential structure.14  Nonetheless, his discussion suggests an attractive 
account of the emotions as quasi-perceptual modes of representation with intentional 
content that are distinct from scientific (deterministic), third-personal representations 
and reveal the world as having particular ‘magical’ properties that are significant for 
action. Setting aside appeals to magic, Sartre’s account of the emotions seems right in 
several ways. As a number of philosophers have argued more recently, it is plausible 
that emotional experience provides a quasi-perceptual understanding of the world as 
being charged with normative force or significance.  I shall return to this idea in section 
8.  
 
7. Basic and Higher Cognitive Emotions 
 
There is a temptation to ask “what is an emotion?” and then go on to defend a set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the extension of the concept.  However, 
emotions vary considerably and, arguably, do not constitute a natural kind.15  In fact, 
despite defending a feeling theory of the emotions in his famous 1884 paper, William 
James writes elsewhere that there are numerous equally defensible systems of 
classification for the emotions: 
If then we should seek to break the emotions, thus enumerated, into groups, 
according to their affinities, it is again plain that all sorts of groupings would be 
possible, according as we chose this character or that as a basis, and that all 
groupings would be equally real and true. The only question would be, does this 
grouping or that suit our purpose best? (1890/1907) 
																																																								
14 Weberman (1996) also presses this line of objection. 
15 Griffiths (1997, 2004) argues that there is little explanatory power and no theoretical unity to the 
category of emotions, and that consequently, the term ‘emotion’ does not pick out a natural kind and 
should be eliminated from theoretical discourse. The sense that the emotions may form an artificial 
category is reinforced by the observation that many languages have no straightforwardly equivalent 
term. See further Dixon (2003).  A further controversy concerns whether particular emotions, such as 
fear or anger, are natural kinds (see Barrett (2006a)). 
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Given the varieties of emotional experience, proposed conceptual analyses typically 
succumb to counterexamples or collapse into unfalsifiable definitions. I am not, 
therefore, attempting to provide a full analysis of emotional experience. Emotional 
experience can be intentional and represent the world as having normative significance.  
However, not all emotions are like this.  So-called basic emotions seem to be a notable 
exception.16 
 
Basic emotions include certain primitive forms of anger, fear, joy, sadness, surprise 
and disgust (Ekman and Friesen 1971; Ekman et al. 1987; Ekman 1999). They are pre-
cognitive, more or less hard-wired responses to environmental stimuli, sometimes 
referred to as ‘affect programs’. In this sense, they are like the startle response. They 
appear to be pan-cultural and homologues are present in many non-human animals 
(Ekman and Friesen 1971; Ekman 1992). So, we can sometimes speak of a person 
being angry in much the same way that a cat is angry. Whereas a cat raises its hackles 
and flashes its tail, a person turns red and grimaces to bare his teeth. In both cases, they 
are signalling that they are prepared to fight, and the bodily manifestations of the 
emotion prime them to do so. Physiologically, basic emotions are correlated with 
subcortical brain activity, especially activity in the amygdala, part of the evolutionarily 
old, limbic system.17  
 
By contrast, higher cognitive emotions arise from interaction between the limbic 
system and the prefrontal cortices. 18  Examples include romantic love, moral 
indignation, nostalgia, regret, envy, pride and jealousy. The expression of these 
emotions, and the associated patterns of action, can be culturally influenced (Griffiths 
and Scarantino 2005; Deonna et al. 2015). They also frequently presuppose concepts 
of self and other. Significantly, the higher cognitive emotions enable us to evaluate 
																																																								
16	Moods seem to be another category of emotions that are neither intentional nor representational. 
Indeed, Griffiths (1997) argues against cognitive accounts of the emotions partly on the grounds that 
emotions such as depression, elation and anxiety do not have obvious intentional objects. J. Deonna and 
F. Teroni (2012) agree that moods are not intentional and, for this reason, argue that moods are not 
emotions.	
17 For detail on the role of the amygdala on moral and social behaviour, see Adoplhs (1999). See also 
Greene and Haidt (2002).  There is, however, continuing debate about whether distinct emotions 
consistently correspond to activity in distinct brain regions.  See Lindquist et al. (2012). 
18 For details on the distinction and an explanation of the underlying physical mechanisms see Damasio 
(1994, 1999).  In particular, the central cingulate region is thought to integrate basic emotions and 
cognition (Panksepp 2003)).  Rather than ‘basic’ and ‘higher cognitive’, Damasio uses the terms 
‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ respectively.   
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both basic emotions and other higher cognitive emotions. So, someone can be proud of 
their courage or ashamed of their lack of empathy. They can also be frightened of their 
fear (or of their fearlessness). The fear that they are frightened of might be a basic 
emotion, whereas the fear they feel concerning their fear is a higher cognitive emotion 
with evaluative content.  
 
It is plausible that some of the debates surrounding cognitivism arise from emphasising 
either the basic or higher cognitive emotions at the expense of the other.  For instance, 
it is sometimes argued that cognitivism over-intellectualises the emotions, and cannot 
account for the emotional lives of children and non-human animals.19 In fact, some 
emotions are more intellectual than others.  While there is a clear distinction between 
paradigmatic examples of basic and higher cognitive emotions, the cognitive content 
of the emotions lies on a continuum.  Moreover, the distinction is not strict.  As just 
mentioned, sometimes the same type of emotion, such as fear, can be found in basic 
and higher cognitive forms.  Shame is another example (Clark 2010, 2012). 
 
The basic emotions are an important part of our affective life.  Indeed, it is probable 
that most human emotions recruit and depend on the feelings that constitute basic 
emotions.  However, the sort of emotional experience I am interested in here involves 
the combination of feeling and representational content that is typical of the higher 
cognitive emotions. As Antonio Damasio writes:  
 
It is the connection between an intricate cognitive content and a variation on a 
preorganized body-state profile that allows us to experience shades of remorse, 
embarrassment, Schadenfreude, vindication, and so on. (1994) 
 
It is this combination or connection between feeling and content that makes the higher 
cognitive emotions candidates for constituting a faculty of moral sensibility.  The 
combination might be explained in various ways. Perhaps, for instance, higher 
cognitive emotions are basic emotions caused by beliefs. Or perhaps higher cognitive 
emotions are basic emotions with cognitive content. Or, perhaps again, higher 
cognitive emotions are basic emotions calibrated with beliefs (see (Prinz 2007)). While 
																																																								
19 Hufendiek (2016) provides a useful overview of objections against cognitivism including this one. 
	 15	
adjudicating between these possibilities is an important task for a theory of the 
emotions, what matters for present purposes is the co-presence of feeling and content 
in the phenomenology of emotional experience. 
 
8. Emotion and Perception 
 
I suggested above that emotional experience can be quasi-perceptual.  The idea that 
emotions are affective perceptions has been defended by a number of philosophers 
including de Sousa (1987), Tappolet (2000, 2012), Prinz (2004), Deonna (2006), 
Döring (2007) and Wringe (2015). One goal of perceptual accounts is to preserve the 
cognitivist insight that emotional experience can be intentional and representational, 
while avoiding the charge of over-intellectualism. Clearly, though, emotions are not 
ordinary forms of sense-perception.  In fact, it usually seems better to think of them as 
responses to sense-perception (or other mental states such as remembering or 
imagining) that change the experiential character of what is perceived (or remembered 
or imagined).  Nevertheless, the analogy is helpful to the extent that it emphasises that 
emotional experience can have representational content and provide a warrant for 
evaluative and normative judgments without being reducible to beliefs.  
 
According to perceputal accounts, emotional experience is a form of perceiving-as. 
Alternatively, we might describe emotions as forms of experiencing-as, trying to 
capture the idea that feeling, thought, and readiness to act are integrated into an 
emotional episode, which, phenomenologically, discloses the world in a new way.  In 
emotional experience, we experience a gorilla as dangerous, a person as lovable, or an 
action as morally contemptible. In one way, this is just as we experience an apparently 
elliptical piece of engraved copper as a round penny. However, emotional experience 
does not reveal an object in a new way in virtue of enabling us to perceive something 
beyond its sensible or perceptible properties; emotional experience should not be 
thought of as a queer form of sense-perception. In Goldie’s example, the difference 
between the times before and after putting the two thoughts together–gorilla dangerous, 
cage open–is not that one has literally seen a new property of the gorilla, the queer 
property of to-be-fearedness. There is no skywriting in the new mental representation 
of the gorilla with the word ‘dangerous’ scrawled across the top. The gorilla’s sensible 
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properties are the same. It is to be feared because of its common-or-garden, natural 
properties, such as its weight, its strength and its occasional propensity for aggression. 
Its property of to-be-fearedness is recognised through the combination of thought and 
affect that is present in emotional experience, in virtue of which it is perceived as 
dangerous.   
 
Goldie also relates this new way of experiencing the world to the issue of motivation:  
 
In feeling fear towards the gorilla you are emotionally engaged with the world, 
and, typically, you are poised for action in a new way – poised for action out of 
the emotion. (2000) 
 
Like zoologists, we can coolly perceive the sensible properties in virtue of which a 
gorilla is to be feared. However, this cool perception does not determine that we will 
fear the gorilla or be motivated to act appropriately in response to the danger it poses. 
This is similar to the case of a sociopath who sees that someone is in pain, but fails to 
experience this a reason to alleviate that pain.  Rather it is when we perceive the gorilla 
as dangerous in emotional experience that we are poised to act.  In this sense Sartre is 
right to say that emotions transmute ‘the determinist world in which we live, into a 
magical world’ (1962).  In feeling fear we are emotionally engaged with the world. 
Consequently, we recognise states of affairs as salient and as constituting normative 
reasons for us.  
 
Whiting (2012) has challenged these kinds of phenomenological claims that are used 
to support perceptual accounts of the emotions. He argues that the phenomenal content 
of smugness, for example, is better understood as a compound of a particular sort of 
pleasurable feeling and a mental representation of a particular sort of achievement. We 
do not perceive the achievement in a new way, but associate it with the feeling.  As it 
happens, this is not how I would describe my own experience of an emotion like 
smugness, which seems to me to be constituted by an embodied experiencing-as.20 
However, these sorts of phenomenological disputes are notoriously hard to resolve.  
Rather than argue about the nature of the compound, i.e., whether the feeling and the 
representation are dissociable components, the important point is that our emotional 
experience of, say, smugness, involves both feelings and mental representations, and 
																																																								
20 Compare Nussbaum’s description of grief (1994). 
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that the complex experience involves representing an object as having properties that 
weren’t previously experienced, such as, in the case of Goldie’s gorilla, the property 
of to-be-fearedness. Goldie captures this combination with his description of emotions 
as ‘feeling towards’ or, equivalently, ‘thinking of with feeling’ (2000).21   
 
9. Evaluating Emotional Experience 
 
I have argued that emotional experience can have representational content.  In 
particular, it can represent certain states of affairs as being normative reasons for action, 
attuning us to the world and focusing our attention on its salient features. To be fearful 
of a gorilla is, in part, to experience the gorilla as dangerous. In this sense, emotions 
can be more belief-like than desire-like. In terms of Anscombe’s popular metaphor, 
emotional experience can have a mind-to-world direction of fit.  There is something 
that it is for emotions to be appropriate or justified depending on how the world is. 
Emotional experience depicts the world in a certain way, and gets it right when the 
world is as depicted. It is therefore evaluable as well as evaluative (J. A. Deonna and 
F. Teroni 2012).  To be fearful of an escaped gorilla may be appropriate. To be fearful 
of a gorilla inside a secure cage is very likely to be a mistake.22 
 
Emotional experience can get things right or wrong in another way. Whereas a belief 
gets things right when its propositional content is true, emotional experience can also 
be evaluated in terms of its phenomenal intensity. If we should be very afraid of the 
gorilla in an unlocked cage, we should be slightly nervous of a capuchin in the same 
situation. If emotional experience can serve as a vehicle for normative judgments, this 
may also help to explain why we experience value as a matter of degree. Sometimes 
our emotional experience has the appropriate direction, but not the appropriate 
intensity. Something has gone wrong if we experience intense moral indignation in 
																																																								
21 Similarly, J. Deonna and F. Teroni (2012) defend a view of the emotions as ‘felt bodily attitudes’ 
directed towards evaluative properties, which captures the idea that emotional experience is an embodied 
form of taking-to-be-the-case. Also along similar lines, Hufendiek defends an account of emotions as 
‘embodied, action-orientated representations’ (2016).  For Hufendiek, the embodied nature of an 
emotion is a constitutive part of its intentional structure.  A further important question concerns the 
psychological processes that produce out unified emotional phenomenology.  One possibility is that the 
different, representational and non-representational states, are unified in emotional experience by a 
process of categorisation or conceptualisation (Barrett 2006b; Barrett et al. 2009). 
22 See Tappolet (2012) for more on emotional errors and illusions. 
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response to a minor, unintentional slight. The intensity of the emotion can be irrational 
in the sense of being out of proportion.  
 
The recognition that an emotional response is out of proportion may in itself calm the 
response.23 It should at least prompt us to recognise that the emotional response is 
inappropriate. Alternatively, it might lead to post hoc rationalisations or confabulations 
in order to avoid cognitive dissonance; for example, a search for reasons that justify 
the initial violence of the emotion. While this is irrational, the phenomenon is only 
intelligible given that emotional intensity is subject to rational evaluation. 
 
Not only are occurrent emotions subject to rational evaluation, so are emotional 
dispositions. Whether we experience particular emotions can depend on our 
background beliefs and dispositions. As with our epistemic dispositions, we can 
cultivate our emotional dispositions directly or indirectly. We can realise that we are 
too quick to anger, and learn to count to ten or redirect our attention. We can make 
efforts to sympathetically imagine the situations of others. By listening to others, we 
can learn to respond appropriately to morally salient facts that we might not recognise 
otherwise. We are also inveterate story-tellers and we learn from each other’s tales of 
everyday life and make-believe. Paying attention to subtle moral distinctions in plays, 
novels, films and other narrative arts also tends to refine our emotional dispositions.24 
 
On the other hand, we can deliberately cultivate emotional experience in ways that 
blind us to the normative significance of our environment, or aspects of it. For instance, 
Hochschild (1983) describes self-induced emotions in airline stewardesses who are 
expected to cultivate a general disposition of cheerfulness regardless of their situation. 
More immediately, we can also affect our emotional responses by controlling our 
bodies. For example, we might follow James’ advice: 
 
																																																								
23 Not always though.  Sometimes emotions are ‘cognitively impenetrable’ in the sense that they persist 
despite an agent having beliefs that undermine their evidential basis.  Some phobias, like the fear of 
flying, are like this. 
24 See Brady (2010) for other ways in which we pay ‘virtuous attention to our emotional systems’. 
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Smooth the brow, brighten the eye, contract the dorsal rather than the ventral 
aspect of the frame, and speak in a major key, pass the genial compliment and 
you heart must be frigid indeed if it does not gradually thaw. (1884) 25 
 
We can also ply ourselves with alcohol, or listen to stirring music, in order to intensify 
feelings of joyfulness, bravery or melancholy. Partly because emotional experience has 
a felt dimension, the cultivation of intense emotions can be pleasurable and even 
addictive (Fisher et al. 2016).  The ability to cultivate emotional experience means that 
we can be held (partly) responsible for the emotions that we experience.  It also means 
that we can improve ourselves qua emotional beings and, hence, qua moral beings if 
emotional experience is indeed integral to our moral nature.   
 
10. Emotional experience and realism 
 
My aim has been to describe aspects of our emotional experience in a way that makes 
it plausible that the emotions can function as a non-queer faculty of moral sensibility 
that reliably and non-accidentally motivates us to act when we recognise normative 
facts.  Perhaps, however, this account will still seem like grist for the mill of the anti-
realist. A particular concern is that even if the world is represented as having normative 
properties in emotional experience, the emotions are unreliable, even maximally 
unreliable, as cognitive capacities. 
 
Indeed, there are good reasons to be cautious about the reliability of our emotions as 
cognitive capacities. As discussed, emotions function as action tendencies and as 
coping mechanisms.  Their basic function seems to be related to successful action 
rather than true beliefs.  Moreover, true beliefs are not always the best means to acting 
successfully. Sometimes heuristics and biases work better, especially in real time. 
Moreover, even if emotions are intentional, we can be wrong about the object of our 
emotions. As Freud observed, emotions can be displaced. We may misdirect our anger 
at Jones towards Smith. Similarly, emotions can spread out beyond their appropriate 
object. For example, disappointment about some particular failure or injustice can 
transmogrify into depression and poison our view of life. Alternatively, a joyful event 
																																																								
25 See Laird and Lacasse (2014) for a review of the empirical evidence supporting James’ common-sense 
advice.  
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can cause us to view the world through ‘rose-tinted spectacles’. Moreover, as I have 
mentioned, emotions can be manipulated in various ways.  
 
An adequate reply would require an account of the psychological processes that give 
rise to emotional experience, an account of the normative properties that emotional 
experience purports to reveal, and a discussion of whether the former is fitted to reliably 
track the latter. As this is far more than I can accomplish here, I shall confine my 
response to four brief points. First, the phenomenon of unreliable emotions supports 
the claim that emotions do have an object, and that the relationship between an emotion 
and its object can be more or less appropriate. So, even if emotional experience 
sometimes misrepresents the world, this misrepresentation must be understood against 
the background expectation that emotional experience can get things right. Second, all 
modes of human cognition can fail to reliably track the facts, sometimes because of 
their susceptibility to deeply ingrained biases or for contingent, evolutionary reasons 
(Stich 1990; Kahneman 2011). If emotional experience has cognitive content, then 
differences in reliability are a matter of degree rather than kind. Third, if we accept that 
emotional experience represents the world as to-be-acted-upon, there is a (contingent) 
evolutionary reason to think that it will be generally reliable, namely that successful 
action typically depends on accurate representation. This consideration is especially 
persuasive when we consider emotional responses to threats and opportunities. Fourth, 
it seems that we can sometimes recognise when the normative facts are misrepresented 
in emotional experience. Sometimes, as I have discussed, this is a matter of bringing 
our emotions to bear on one another. This is no more worrying in principle than 
correcting perception with perception. However, it also suggests an independent 




One way to meet Mackie’s argument from queerness is to show that we have a non-
queer, naturalistically respectable faculty of moral sensibility in virtue of which we are 
reliably and non-accidentally motivated by normative facts when we recognise them.  
I have argued that emotional experience can be intentional, evaluative, evaluable, and 
quasi-perceptual. These features make it a plausible candidate for this sort of faculty.  
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The account I have defended is also consistent with the view that emotional experience 
provides a (defeasible) warrant for normative judgments.  Finally, it is consistent with 
a realist ontology according to which the normative facts constitute a mind-
independent standard against which emotional content can be evaluated.  
 
Is it in fact the case that emotional experience puts us into cognitive contact with 
normative reality?  While the arguments of this paper provide some reasons for 
optimism, much work is yet to be done. We need adequate accounts of the normative 
phenomena and also the psychological processes that underlie the phenomenology of 
emotional experience. While plenty of work has been done in both areas, less has been 
done to see whether they fit together in ways that would support (or undermine) moral 
realism.  Do the psychological processes provide us with a non-queer mode of access 
to normative reality?  A satisfactory answer can only be based on interdisciplinary 
research.  We cannot study the psychological processes from the armchair, and, without 
these data, we cannot say whether the processes that underlie our phenomenology are 
sensitive to normative facts.  This means that we cannot do the metaethics solely from 
the armchair.  On the other hand, we cannot say whether the psychological processes 
are sensitive to normative facts without an account of what those facts are or could be.  
To give such an account is to do moral philosophy.  This means that we cannot do the 
metaethics solely from the laboratory either. 
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